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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOHNN. BACH,
Supreme Court No. 31716

Plaintiff/ Respondent,

~ILED-COP,

v.

ALVA A. HARRIS, et al.,

MAY 28 3111B

Defendants / Appellants.

I

Supreme c,urt---~9urt of AppealsEntered on ATS by: -

APPELLANTS'BRIEF
'
Appealed from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Teton County
Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge

Appellant and Attorney for Appellants
Alva A. Harris, Esq.
POBox479
Shelley, Idaho 83274
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John N. Bach, Pro Se
PO Box 101
Driggs ID 83422
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case arises as a result of a lawsuit filed by Plaintiff John N. Bach against numerous
Defendants alleging a laundry list ofallegations against numerous Defendants. An initial Complaint
alleged that there was damaged property, racketeering and al.legations of threats of batteries. The
Amended Complaint contained the allegations and sougbt damages in excess of one million dollars
and sougbt punitive damages in excess of five million dollars. Appellants filed a Notice of
Appearance and a Motion to Dismiss. While the Motion to Dismiss was pending, the Court Clerk
entered a Default against Appellants. Aferthe Motion to Dismiss was denied, without any additional
notice, Plaintiff submitted an Application For EntryOfDefanltpursuant to IRCP 55(a) which default
was entered by the Court Clerk. Without having received notice of the application for default, and
approximately four hours after the default had been entered by the Court, the Appellants filed their
Answer in this matter. Appellants thereafter moved to set aside the default which the Trial Court
denied. Thereafter the Trial Court entered Judgment against the defaulted Defendants. From these
orders, Appellants Appeal.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On Inly 23, 2002, Plaintiff filed his Complaint seeking among other things damage to his
property and person and alleging allegations ofracketeering and seeking an injunction and damages

in excess of a million dollars and punitive damages in excess of five million dollars. See Clerk's
Record (hereinafter "R"), Vol. 1, p. 1. The Appellants Alva Harris on his ovm behalf, and on behalf
of Defendants Bob Fitzgerald, Ole Oleson, and Blake Lyle submitted a Notice of Appearance on
August 5, 2008. See R., Vol. 1, p. 16. The Trial Court ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended
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Complaintthat properly set forth the allegations. See R, Vol. 1, p. 45. Therefater, on September 27,
2002 Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. On November 8, 2002, Appellants filed a Motion
to Dismiss asking the Comt to strike the First Amended Complaint and consolidate this case with
another Teton County Case.
On January 22, 2003, Appellants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8)
requesting the Court to dismiss the pleadings because of a pending case in the Federal Court (CV01-266-E-TGN). The Clerk of the Court entered aDefanlt against the Appellants on January 27,
2003. See R, Vol 3, p. 446. On March 4, 2003, the Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss in its
Eighth Order on Pending Motions. See R, Vol. 2, p. 246, at 256. Thereafter on March 19, 2003,
Appellants filed an Answer and Demand for Jury Trial. See R, Vol. 2, p. 317, at 319. The Answer
asserted defenses of statute oflimitatious, failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may
be granted, that the Plaintiff was more responsible for his comparative negligence than were
Defendants, that any alleged damages were a result of third parties, that the defendant is barred by
the doctrines res judicata, judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, waiver, failure to exhaust judicial
remedies, doctrine of qualified immunity, unclean hands, misrepresentation, and requested a jury
trial.

On March 19, 2003, the same day Appellants filed their Answer, but apparently earlier that
day, the Plaintiff submitted a Clerk's Default and Affidavit, Application of Default which Clerk's
Default was entered by the Clerk. SeeR, Vol. 2, p. 320-322. Appellants timely filed a Motion to
Set Aside Default. See R, Vol. 2, p. 324. Thereafter, Appellants filed a Notice of Hearing on the
Motion to Set Aside Default and to reinstate the Answer and supported it with an Affidavit. See R,
Vol. 4, p. 540A-E. The Trial Court denied the Motion to Set Aside and entered Default Judgment
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against the Appellants following an evidentiary hearing. See R Vol. 7, p. 1101, Vol. 8, p. 1367.
The Trial Court thereafter entered a Final Judgment. SeeR, Vol. 9, p. 1505.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the Court err as a matter of law in allowing the Clerk's Default to be entered

when a prior default had already been entered and an Answer filed?
2.

Did the Court err in exercising its discretion when it refused to set aside the Clerk's

Default?
3.

Did the Court err when it imposed a monetary Judgment that was based on

speculation?

ill.

ARGUMENT
Appellants assert that the Trial Court erred in having a default entered and failing to set aside

the default and subsequently for entering a default judgment.

A.

CLERK'S DEFAULT

IRCP 12(a) provides that a Defendant shall have twenty (20) days after service of Summons
and Complaint to file an answer or other permitted motion. fu the event the Court denies the motion,
the responsive pleading shall be served withing ten (10) days after notice of the court's action. In
this case, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appearance and multiple motions, including a Motion to
Dismiss. The Trial Court Clerk entered a default in this matter on January 27, 2003, even though a
pending Motion to Dismiss was filed. Thereafter, that default was not set aside until the Trial Court's
order on June 2, 2003 (See R Vol. 4, p. 563), approximately two and a half months after an Answer
had been filed.
IRCP Rule 55(a)(l) stated in 2003 as follows:
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When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the
court, or the clerk thereof, shall enter default against the party.
In 2004, the rule was amended to clarify that the Court was to enter an Order ordering the default
and also requiring a 3-d.ay written notice of the application of any default, effectively making as a
rule what had been the practice.
JRCP 55(a)(l)(as amended in 2004) provides as follows:
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the
court, shall order entry of default against the party. Default shall not
be entered against a party who has appeared in the action unless that
party (or, if appearing by representative, the party's representative)
has been served with three (3) days 'Nritten notice of the application
for entry of such default.

In this matter, it is clear that although the Appellants had appeared in the case and filed multiple
motions, that no notice was given to Appellants of any intended default. The Affidavit submitted
by Plaintiff in connection with his default does not state or attest that any notice was given to the
Appellants of the intended default. The Trial Court's refusal to vacate the entry of default should be
reversed.
This Court has clearly stated the policy that defaults are not favored and should be set aside
in doubtful cases. See Suitts v. Nicks, 141 Idaho 706, 708 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005) ("Because
judgments by default are not favored, a trial court should grant relief in doubtful cases in order to
decide a case on the merits.);Jobnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727, 732, 662
P.2d 1171, 1176 (1993) ("Judgments by default are not favored, and the general rule in doubtful
cases is to grant relief from the judgment in order to reach a judgment on the merits.") This Court
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has set forth the overriding oilier policy that "[p ]rocedural rules, other than those which are
jurisdictional, should be applied to promote the disposition of causes upon their merits."Id.
Furthermore, this Court stated "Irr determining whether to set aside a default judgment, we must
apply a standard of liberality rafuer than strictness and give the party moving to vacate the default
the benefit of a genuine doubt." Id. at 733, 662 P .2d at 1177.
It should be noted that at the time Appellants petitioned the Court to set aside the default,
fuere had been no judgment entered. Tue Idaho Court of Appeal's decision in McFarland v. Curtis,
123 Idaho 931, 854 P.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1993), noted that the burden to set aside a default is less
stringent then the Rule 60(b) standard to set aside a default judgment. Id. at 936,854 P.2d at 279.
Defaults are to be set aside if god cause is shown. See IRCP 55(c). Appellants assert that good
cause existed to set aside the default. Appellants submitted an Answer to this matter on the same
day an Application for Default was filed. There was no notice of an intent to take default provided
to Appellants. Appellants did not receive a copy of the Affidavit for Entry of Default until he
received it in the mail on March 31, 2003. See R, Vol. 4, p. 540d. Plaintiff would not have ben
prejudiced by the setting aside of a default. In the present case, the Trial Court found no facts.
Because no facts were found by the Trial Court, this Court is "at liberty to form our own impressions
from the record and to exercise our own discretion in deciding whether the Default Judgment should
have been set aside." Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727, 732, 662 P.2d
1171, 1176 (1983). Appellants also plead facts that would constitute a defense to the suit. In the

Answer filed by Appellants (See, R, Vol. 2, p. 317-319), the Appellants asserted defenses of statute
oflimitatio:ns, comparative negligence, acts by third parties, doctrines res judicata.,judicial estoppel,
collateral estoppel, waiver, failure to exhaust judicial remedies, doctrine of qualified immunity,
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unclean hands, and misrepresentation. In Johnson, the Court analyzed whether sufficient facts had
been plead which would constitute a defense. To determine the facts which had been plead to
constitute a defense, the Johnson Court reviewed the answer and analyzed the defenses asserted. Id.
at 733. 662 P.2d at 1177. The Court determined that the Answer could establish a defense and set
aside the Default Judgment. Appellants herein assert that a meritorious defense has been shown
here, and the default should be vacated.
Appellants assert that the amount of damages simply was not proven in this matter to any
degree ofcertainty. This Court has held that damages have to proven with reasonable certainty. This
requires that they be taken out of the reahn of speculation. See Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co.,
Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). In the present case, although there was a
hearing set for the testimony on February 3, 2004, there was no meaningful substantive testimony
given. Plaintiff rested on his exhibits. See Clerk's Transcript at p. 1461-1464. Appellants assert
that the Affidavits did not contain sufficient facts to take the damages out of the realm of
speculation. See Exhibits 81-1 to 81-6, 83-86. For example, Plaintiff wholly failed to establish
ownership of the real property, which is a prerequisite for an award of damages for slander of title.

IV.

CONCLUSION
Appellants assert the Trial Court erred in not setting aside the default. As previously set

forth, an Answer was filed within hours ofwhen the Clerk's Default was entered. Because defaults
are not favored and there is a public policy of getting to the merits of cases, the Trial Court should
have set aside the default and allowed the pied defenses to be tried. Appellants assert that the Court
erred as a matter oflaw when it vacated a default and imposed a subsequent default when an Answer
had been filed. Additionallytbe Court abused its discretion in not allowing the default to be set aside
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where good cause was shown as well as a meritorious defense. Further, the Court erred when it
entered a Default Judgment where there was insufficient evidence presented to take the amount of
damages out of the realm of speculation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27 th day of May, 2008.

Alva Harris, Esq.
Appellant and Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 27m day of May, 2008, I served a two (2) true and correct copies of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
John N. Bach, Pro Se
PO Box 101
Driggs ID 83422

(,/) Mail

Anne Broughton, Pro Se
1054 Rmnmell Mo1Illtain Rd
Tetonia ID 83452

(,/) Mail

Gregory W. Moeller
RIGBY ANDRUS & MOELLER
POBox250
Rexburg ID 83440

(,/) Mail

Jason D. Scott

(,/) Mail

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
POBoxl617
Boise ID 83701-1617
David H. Shipman
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKEITHANSEN &
HOOPES, PLLC
POBox51219
Idaho Falls ID 83405-1219

(./) Mail

Galen Woelk
RUNYA."N &WOELK, P.C.
POBox533
Driggs ID 83422

(,/) Mail

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge St
Blackfoot ID 83221

(./) Rand Delivery

V

•

Alva Harns
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